Our Rough Beast.

And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming, 1921

ALL OVER THE WORLD, devout Christians will be reaching for their bibles, reading and re-reading Revelation 13:16-17. For the benefit of all you non-Christians out there, these are the verses describing the economic power of the beast.

“And he causes all, both small and great, rich and poor, free and slave, to be marked on the right hand or the forehead, and that no one can buy or sell unless he has the mark, the name of the beast, or the number of his name.”

Okay, okay, 47 is not 666, and the ergot-induced visions of a First Century hermit, living in a cave on the Greek island of Patmos, are hardly the most reliable guide to what is happening in the Year of Our Lord 2025. But, you have to admit, the spectacle of Donald Trump commanding the whole earth (including the penguins of Australia’s Heard and McDonalds Islands) to bend the knee to his universal tariffs, is pretty evocative of what are beginning to look remarkably like the “end times” – of globalisation.

The question I hear people ask, over and over again, is “How?” How did this happen? How is it that the CEOs of America’s largest corporations have been willing to watch trillions of dollars knocked off the value of their collective stocks – in silence? Why hasn’t Trump been summoned, as Howard Beale, hero of the 1976 movie classic Network, was summoned, to be reminded of the exact nature of the activity in which he is engaged? Why hasn’t Trump been told:

“You have meddled with the primal forces of nature ….. and I won’t have it! Is that clear? You think you’ve merely stopped a business deal. That is not the case! ….. It is ebb and flow, tidal gravity! It is ecological balance! You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations. There are no peoples. There are no Russians. There are no Arabs. There are no third worlds. There is no West. There is only one holistic system of systems, one vast and immense, interwoven, interacting, multivariate, multinational dominion of dollars.”

Of course the world was very different in the mid-1970s. For a start, the American constitution had just been stress-tested by Watergate – tip of the criminal iceberg that was the Nixon presidency – and it had come through with flying colours. To be sure, the USA of President Jimmy Carter faced numerous challenges, but the American system still worked, it hadn’t fallen apart.

Trump’s political success was predicated on the contrary proposition being true – America was falling apart. As evidence of its disintegration, the USA’s two-party system no longer seemed capable of choosing presidential candidates who could reach out and connect with the crucial clusters of angry voters, living in swing states, who now decided American elections.

The buy-in simply wasn’t there for the traditional country-club Republicans, or the bureaucratic liberals of a Democratic Party which, rather than representing American workers, condescended to and patronised them.

When push had come to shove in the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09, the “Yes We Can” president, Barack Obama, had saved Wall Street, and allowed Main Street to go to the Devil. As a consequence, the game of politics became increasingly difficult to play.

Highly educated Americans with good jobs couldn’t understand poorly educated Americans with shit jobs. The Republicans drinking at the Country Club had no idea what sort of candidate alienated working-class Democrats getting drunk at their local bar might be willing to vote for.

But Donald Trump did. Like that other great political adventurer, Charles-Louis Napoléon Bonaparte (1808–1873) who made himself President, then Emperor, of France in the 1850s and 60s, Trump forced his way between the wheels and cogs of a political system that had ground to a halt, gave the machinery a hefty whack, and achieved a surprise victory that delighted his friends to roughly the same degree that it confounded his enemies.

By 2025 what used to be true of the USA is fast becoming true of the whole world. Everywhere, the wheels and the cogs are stuck. The global machinery needs a hefty whack. Sadly, the only politicians willing to deliver such blows are openly scornful of democratic pieties.

And so, the hour of Trump, our rough beast, comes round at last.

This essay was originally published in The Otago Daily Times and The Greymouth Star on Friday, 11 April 2025.

What does India Want? What is New Zealand willing to give?

Give me what I want, what I really, really want:  And what India really wants from New Zealand isn’t butter or cheese, but a radical relaxation of the rules controlling Indian immigration.

WHAT DOES INDIA WANT from New Zealand? Not our dairy products, that’s for sure, it’s got plenty of those. Indeed 45 percent of the Indian population are small-scale farmers, most of them running a few head of cattle – not to eat, you understand – but to milk. If it once made no sense to send coals to Newcastle, it makes even less sense, in 2025, to send dairy products to India.

So, what does India want?

To answer that question it is important to understand where India currently stands in the process of economic maturation. In the most brutal terms, India stands in roughly the same place as Britain stood when the agricultural and industrial revolutions were generating population pressures that were fast becoming unsustainable. For a while, Britain’s industrial revolution was able to soak up most of the victims of its agricultural revolution. Those who could not, or (understandably) would not, be absorbed into the “dark satanic mills” of industrialisation, took the option of emigration.

The crucial difference between Britain’s options in the Nineteenth century and India’s options in the Twenty-First is that the Earth is carrying roughly eight times as many human-beings as it was in 1825.

Two hundred years ago there were places for Britain’s (and Europe’s) excess population to go. North America and Australasia were blessed with land – vast quantities of land – whose numerically insignificant (thanks to the arrival of European pathogens against which they had no natural immunity) indigenous peoples could not hope to defend, and the colonisers took it. Resource rich, and soon to become people rich, these territories contributed decisively to the global reach and power of the European way of doing business.

Returning to that extraordinary statistic relating to India’s primary production sector – i.e. that 45 percent of its population are small-scale farmers – what must happen if India wishes to conform to the historical rules of economic development? Simply put, those small farmers must be replaced by the sort of large-scale, and vastly more efficient, farming enterprises that characterise North American, European, and Australasian agriculture.

Will the small farmers of India go quietly into the good historical night? Unlikely.

Viewed dispassionately, the political raison d’être of Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has always been to capture India’s small farmers before they were captured irretrievably by ideological forces less malleable to the needs of India’s elites. Modi’s Hindu nationalist populism has proved itself many times over, albeit at the cost of dismantling the Congress Party’s secular dream of a modern, religiously tolerant, and inclusive Indian state.

But, if India’s elites are to be congratulated for saving the world from the emergence of not one nation with a billion-plus citizens under the control of a communist party, but two, then that success has been won at the cost of seriously distorting the evolution of India’s economy.

Fewer than 20 percent of India’s labour force are employed in the nation’s secondary industries, and most of them are construction workers. As things now stand, there is simply no way India’s vast numbers of small-holders and agricultural labourers can be absorbed (as Britain’s were) in its factories. Not to put too fine a point upon it, China has already beaten India in the race to create a second “workshop of the world”.

Barring a geopolitical cataclysm, China’s victory is not about to be reversed anytime soon. [Although Donald Trump is doing his best! - C.T.]

So, where does that leave Christopher Luxon and his ambitious plans to open up India to New Zealand’s exports?

It leaves him facing a nation that must somehow earn enough from its secondary and tertiary sectors to keep its small-holders safe from the ambitions of investors determined to rationalise Indian agriculture.

This raises a number of possibilities for “New Zealand Inc”. Not the least of which is the contribution this country’s agricultural expertise could make to the voluntary consolidation of small-scale Indian farming operations into larger, more efficient, and much more profitable units. This country’s long history of successful farmer co-operatives makes it the ideal partner for a more equitable, owner-driven, transformation of India’s agricultural sector.

New Zealand could also embark on a major upscaling of it educational exports to India. This could be done in two ways: firstly, by providing New Zealand’s tertiary institutions with the resources required to make many more places available to full-fee-paying Indian students; and secondly, by inviting Indian investors to participate alongside New Zealand universities in establishing “franchise” institutions in India itself.

Tuition in English, at New Zealand’s well-established and (generally) well-respected universities, remains a powerful selling-point to middle-class Indian parents anxious to see their offspring well-credentialled in an increasingly competitive society. Most particularly when merit-based access to the upper-ranks of income-earners – via the most prestigious Indian universities – can no longer be guaranteed.

None of these options are a “sure thing”, however, while the offer that would really open doors for New Zealand Inc continues to be ruled out-of-bounds by New Zealand’s negotiators. What India really wants from New Zealand isn’t butter or cheese, but a radical relaxation of the rules controlling Indian immigration.

India isn’t seeking this concession because it is in love with New Zealand’s scenery, or its values. The Indian government is seeking similar changes from the United States, Canada, and Australia – as well as New Zealand. By increasing the Indian diaspora, it is hoped, India will follow in China’s footsteps. Trade may or may not follow a nation’s flag, but it sure as heck follows its people.

It is difficult to see the National Government being willing to court the political backlash that such a dramatic increase in Indian immigration would doubtless engender. Were Luxon to secure his promised New Zealand-India FTA by giving India what it most wants, NZ First would have all it needed to campaign against its former coalition partner with every prospect of increasing its tally of seats. Te Pati Māori would, similarly, be free to its indulge its worst xenophobic impulses without fear of losing votes. One suspects that even Labour would struggle to stay off the anti-immigrant band-wagon. Only the Greens could embrace the new policy without reservation.

That said, facilitating Indian immigration makes solid historical sense. The expectation that New Zealand could remain forever a proud redoubt of British ethnicity and culture at the bottom of the world should never have survived the demise of the British Empire. Indeed, there are those who argue strongly that it didn’t. They point to the 1986 Burke Report that quietly recommended the discarding of the de facto “White New Zealand” policy in favour of an immigration policy geared towards creating a multicultural New Zealand.

Given the fact that, in 2025, upwards of 20 percent of New Zealand residents were born somewhere else, the policy must be accounted a success.

An interesting exercise in counterfactual history is to ask what sort of country New Zealand would have grown into had the Burke Report recommended the continuation and strengthening of the White New Zealand policy. Rather than the generally welcoming and inclusive multicultural society that Aotearoa-New Zealand has grown into over the last 40 years, an alternative vision, of an embittered and isolated nation of increasingly unapologetic white supremacists, is distressingly easy to imagine.

Quite where that would have left Māori is anybody’s guess. Without Te Reo? Without the Waitangi Tribunal? With Te Tiriti once again dismissed as “a simple nullity”. Reduced to an unrelenting diet of white-bread and butter?

Faced with that dismal vision, a bowl of spicy Rogan Josh, with a side-plate of Naan Bread, doesn’t sound so bad!

This essay was originally posted on the Interest.co.nz website on Monday, 24 March 2025.

Chris Trotter 

is now on 

Substack 

visit him at 

christrotter418256.substack.com

Luxon’s Guests.

Speilmeister: Christopher Luxon’s prime-ministerial pitches notwithstanding, are institutions with billions of dollars at their disposal really going to invest them in a country so obviously in a deep funk?

HAVING WOOED THE WORLD’s investors, what, if anything, has New Zealand won? Did Christopher Luxon’s guests board their private jets fizzing with enthusiasm for a little country palpably eager to embark on a new national adventure? Or, did they depart in a more sombre mood, disappointed by New Zealanders’ lack of spirit? Will institutions with billions of dollars at their disposal invest them in a country so obviously in a deep funk?

Or will they, like Michael Corleone in Godfather Part II, take note of more than the sales pitch of the gangster asking him to invest in the Mob’s Cuban casinos in 1959?

MICHAEL CORLEONE: I saw a strange thing today. Some rebels were being arrested. One of them pulled the pin on a grenade. He took himself and the captain of the command with him. Now, soldiers are paid to fight; the rebels aren’t.

HYMAN ROTH: What does that tell you?

MICHAEL CORLEONE: They could win.

It’s a safe bet that the real global investment community pays at least as much attention to what’s happening inside the countries asking for their money as the fictional Michael Corleone. After all, they pay a great deal of money to secure the most accurate and up-to-date information about their hosts. Not just the raw economic data, but information concerning the general disposition of the nation. Not only about the mood of the men and women seated around the boardroom table, but also about the mood of the men and women thronging the streets below.

Interviewed on Radio New Zealand, Tainui strongman, Tukoroirangi Morgan, boasted that he had told the global investors not to waste their time talking to the Crown, but to approach directly the iwi engaged in growing the Māori economy.

Though he gave it his best shot, Christopher Luxon’s pitch to the assembled global investors is unlikely to have resonated as loudly as Morgan’s. New Zealand’s prime minister, as they would have been well aware, leads a state whose outgoings far exceed its incomings, and a beleaguered government desperate for economic growth. All the corporate jargon in the world cannot disguise the brute fact of Luxon’s political need.

By contrast, Morgan and the many other iwi leaders presiding over the burgeoning Māori economy, would likely have struck Luxon’s guests as loud, proud, and hungry for the capital needed to keep their tribal enterprises growing. Māori businesspeople are not begging to be bailed out, they are asking to be built up. Because, as they were no doubt quick to remind these trillion-dollar tauiwi, the only place tangata whenua can succeed is right here. They have to win.

Were Luxon’s guests able to travel back in time 150 years they would have encountered Pakeha with almost as much skin in the burgeoning enterprise of “New Zealand” as the Māori of today.

These were immigrants who had travelled 16,000 miles, leaving behind everyone and everything they had known, and betting all they had on their ability to wrest a future from these distant islands. And what would have impressed today’s big investors – just as it did the big, mostly British, investors of the Nineteenth century – was how much these settlers were willing to wager on the proposition that New Zealand had a future, and how confident they were of winning the bet.

That confidence was crucial to securing the capital investment necessary to make a nation. Fortunately for the colonisers of New Zealand, the Nineteenth Century was awash with confidence.

In his book “Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939” (Oxford, 2009) the New Zealand historian James Belich examines the extraordinary racial confidence that fuelled and underpinned the breakneck economic development, demographic conquest, and cultural domination of North America and Australasia:

“Though somewhat unmilitary, they were dangerous people, especially when in full-frothing boom frenzy. When they had the help of their trusty oldlands, as well as massive boom time numbers and the fanatical ideology of the colonising crusade, hardly anything could stop them. They destroyed, crippled, swamped, or marginalised most of the numerous societies they encountered. They also built new societies faster than anyone had ever done before.”

Certainly, it is hard to argue with that final sentence. In the century that followed the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the Pakeha population of New Zealand exploded from around 2,000 to nearly 2,000,000. The four main centres grew from a few hastily erected wooden structures to substantial cities of stone and brick. Railways and roads linked rural villages and provincial towns to the major ports. Industries grew and flourished.

The cultures and politics of Belich’s “Anglo-World” were shaped by what he identifies as the boom-bust-recolonisation phases that first created and then consolidated it.

In this regard, the history of New Zealand conforms very neatly to Belich’s template. First came the great investor-fuelled rush for land and resources; drawing in tens-of-thousands of immigrants and driving off the Māori tribes. This initial speculative and extractive economic boom was succeeded by a period of contraction and retrenchment – the “bust” – which was followed by a second, much less anarchic, surge of immigration and investment – both prompted by the nation-defining technological innovation of refrigeration.

The question to be decided by Luxon’s guests is whether or not Belich’s three phases are still driving the economic and social history of New Zealand, and, if they are, which phase is the country going through in 2025 – boom, bust, or recolonisation?

It is difficult to sustain the argument that New Zealand is in the middle of a boom. In terms of metrics and mood the nation would appear to be situated squarely in the middle of a bust. Equally difficult to sustain is the argument that New Zealand is now, or ever likely to be again, driven by the “fanatical ideology of the colonising crusade” which underpinned its first 100 years. Booms seldom follow the mass emigration of the dominant culture’s best and brightest. Nor are the chances high that Mother England, or even Uncle Sam, will come to the rescue of the Anglo-World’s most remote outpost. Only in te Ao Māori is the cultural confidence of which booms are made on display.

What does that tell us? What should it tell the world’s big investors? Possibly, that the best returns are likely to come from backing the most daring and innovative sectors of the fast-growing Māori economy.

They could win.

This essay was originally posted on the Interest.co.nz website on Monday, 17 March 2025.

Whistling Past The Graveyard.

“Bugger the pollsters!”

WHEN EVERYBODY LIVED in villages, and every village had a graveyard, the expression “whistling past the graveyard” made more sense. Even so, it’s hard to describe the Coalition Government’s response to the latest Taxpayers’ Union/Curia Research poll any better. Regardless of whether they wanted to go there, or not, the polling data is leading the Coalition partners’ thoughts inexorably towards the dreary burial-ground of electoral hopes.

As they draw nearer to that dismal place, the tune they have elected to whistle to keep up the courage of their jittery supporters is that old political favourite: “Don’t Worry, We’ve Been Here Before.”

Conservative voters are invited to cast their minds back to 1990-1993, the first term of the Jim Bolger-led National Government. (That rules out every voter under the age of 40, but, never mind, they can always Google it!)

In the years preceding the 1993 General Election, we are told by National’s whistlers, the opinion polls also showed National lagging behind its opponents. (One survey put them at just 21 percent!) When all the votes had been counted, however, National found itself with just enough seats to govern.

On the night, and facing the prospect of a hung parliament, Bolger was not moved to breathe a huge sigh of relief. In the run-up to election day, he had been persuaded that National was on track for a comfortable win. Denied his easy victory, a clearly frustrated Bolger was moved to deliver the most memorable quote of the entire campaign:

“Bugger the pollsters!”

But, National’s whistlers are forgetting something. The General Election of 1993 was the last conducted under the First-Past-the-Post (FPP) electoral system. Indeed, it was also the year in which New Zealanders voted decisively to replace FPP with Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation. Looking for solace in Bolger’s narrow 1993 victory is, therefore, a lot like looking for cheese in a chalk factory.

Not a good analogy, then? But wait, it gets weirder.

The Jim Bolger-led National Party had been swept to victory in 1990 on a wave of revulsion at the damage inflicted upon New Zealand society by Labour’s “Rogernomics” – the top-down free-market revolution for which it had never asked, or received, an unequivocal mandate. Promising a return to the “Decent Society” of happy memory, Bolger’s party romped home with just shy of 48 percent of the popular vote.

Three years later, after discovering that the Decent Society entailed the Employment Contracts Act, the Mother of All Budgets, and user-pays health care, National emerged from the last FPP election with just 35 percent of the popular vote. The anti-government parties, Labour, the Alliance and NZ First, between them accounted for 61 percent of the popular vote.

It is practically inconceivable that the 1993 election result, replicated under New Zealand’s current electoral system, would see the incumbent government returned to office. What happened in 1993, largely on account of the anti-government vote being split three ways, would not happen today, because under MMP the parties opposing the government would be allocated parliamentary seats in proportion to the number of Party Votes they received.

Barring something unprecedented occurring (like Labour entering into a “grand coalition” with National) if the 2026 General Election leaves the anti-government parties sharing 61 percent of the popular vote – as they did in 1993 – then they will have more than enough seats to form a government.

After all, the 50.6 percent claimed by Labour, the Greens and Te Pāti Māori in the Taxpayers Union/Curia Research Poll would still give them enough seats to govern.

National hung on in 1993 because, under FPP, 35 percent of the vote was enough to secure them just enough seats to govern. But National, Act, and NZ First, if they continue, as Bolger’s government continued between 1990 and 1993, to implement policies opposed by a significant majority of the New Zealand electorate, should not anticipate a similar, by-the-skin-of-their-teeth, happy ending.

And yet, this is precisely the advice being tendered to the Coalition Government by the Taxpayers’ Union and other assorted ideological cheerleaders. The very policies that are driving the Government’s numbers down, it is suggested, must not be discarded as electoral liabilities, but instead, “all options should be on the table”.

Rather than whistling past the graveyard, any government disposed to heed such advice should probably be praying in the church.

This essay was originally published in The Otago Daily Times and The Greymouth Star of Friday, 14 March 2025.

Leadership Problems.

Contenders: The next question after “Will Luxon really go?” is, of course, “Will that work?” The answer to that question lies not so much in the efficacy of Luxon’s successor as it does in the perceived strength of the Centre-Left alternative.

AT LEAST TWO prominent political commentators are alluding publicly to the imminence of a leadership spill in the National Party. Matthew Hooton and Duncan Garner have both written recently about the National Party’s growing dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s performance. This sort of commentary would be much easier for conservatives to dismiss were it coming from the usual left-wing suspects, but neither Hooton nor Garner fall into that category. If the Centre (let alone the Right) cannot hold, then things are most certainly falling apart.

The next question after “Will Luxon really go?” is, of course, “Will that work?” The answer to that question lies not so much in the efficacy of Luxon’s successor as it does in the perceived strength of the Centre-Left alternative.

Chris Hipkins is pulling out all the stops to convince New Zealanders that Labour can indeed assemble a more effective and efficient coalition government than the fractious assemblage currently running the country. He used the occasion of his (rather belated) State of the Nation address to the Auckland Chamber of Commerce on Friday (7/3/25) to reassure the business community that his party is committed to comporting itself in a thoroughly non-threatening fashion.

As proof of these moderate intentions, Hipkins later announced a reshuffled, ‘all the talents’, shadow-cabinet – presumably committed to rolling out equally non-threatening policies. It is many years since horses crowded the nation’s streets, but even if they were still there, we may be certain that Labour has nothing planned that would frighten them even a little.

Does that mean that Labour has abandoned all thought of raising taxes, or, even worse, imposing that perennial horse-frightener – a Capital Gains Tax (CGT)? Not at all. It simply means that, in marked contrast to earlier Labour leaders, Hipkins intends to make the case for Labour’s revenue-enhancing policies well before the formal campaign launches in September/October 2026.

In this regard, Labour will be able to draw on the widespread global support for CGTs. New Zealand remains an outlier among the members of the OECD for the disinclination of its political leadership – Left as well as Right – to introduce a comprehensive tax on capital gains. Beset by the same demographic pressures as the rest of the developed world, the New Zealand state remains unusually reliant on income and sales taxes to pay for its core services. As the cost of these services, health in particular, continues to grow, the ability of the state to pay for them, without increasing its revenue, must be called into question.

Finance Minister Nicola Willis’s willingness to meet her government’s core obligations by incurring more and more debt will, as her Treasury advisers were quick to point out, very rapidly become economically unsustainable. But diluting those obligations, by reducing or privatising core public services will, even more rapidly, become politically unsustainable.

The present government’s economic and political difficulties are attributable almost entirely to its unfathomable decision to slash billions off the state’s income by cutting taxes when virtually every part of the state apparatus was crying out for more, and just about every responsible economist was arguing against it. Attempting to resolve the inevitable (and self-imposed) fiscal crisis by cutting state expenditure, has only compounded the Coalition’s difficulties.

On its face the Coalition’s behaviour seems self-defeating, which is why left-leaning commentator Rob Campbell’s latest contribution to The Post is so intriguing. In brief, Campbell sees a great deal more method than madness in the Coalition’s behaviour.

Stripping away its pious posturings and well-worn excuses, the former trade union leader reveals what he considers to be five key shifts at the heart of the Coalition’s policies:

• From public to private investment and delivery.
• From an emergent bi-cultural, back to a colonial nation.
• From universal to user charges.
• From regulated to market-use of resources.
• From limits on, to incentives for, private investment returns.

The temptation for Hipkins and his colleagues to pledge themselves to rolling-back the Coalition’s right-wing policy transitions will be strong. If they succumb, it would require an incoming centre-left government to reprioritise:

• Public provision over private enterprise.
• Tino rangatiratanga over colonial institutions.
• Universal provision over user pays.
• Rational regulation over laissez-faire.
• The public good over private interest.

This isn’t quite the pitch Hipkins made to the Auckland Chamber of Commerce. His purpose there was to play up the continuities embedded in National and Labour policy – especially with regard to the restoration of New Zealand’s decrepit infrastructure. Picking up on the growing disquiet at the Coalition’s apparent obsession with tearing down everything Labour had built, Hipkins was also careful to reassure his audience that while Labour might amend the policies of its predecessor, it does not share its affinity for the wrecking-ball.

The name for this approach is the “small-target strategy”. The idea being that the less one’s opponents have to aim at, the less they can hit. Sir Keir Starmer’s emphatic 2024 victory over the British Conservatives represented a huge vindication of the strategy, which might also be described as relying upon your opponent’s failures, rather than your own party’s policies, to carry you into office. Or, as Napoleon expressed the same idea: “Never interrupt your enemy when he’s making a mistake.” Bold and detailed policies are a dangerous distraction.

In the context of MMP, however, one’s own party’s commendable policy discipline can easily be compromised by the wild policy incontinence of one’s putative coalition partners. A strong and measured argument in favour of introducing a CGT on the part of Labour could all-too-easily be undermined by the Greens trumpeting a swingeing Wealth Tax on the non-tax-paying rich. And even that degree of fiscal radicalism might be overwhelmed by Te Pāti Māori demanding that full compensation for the crimes of colonisation be paid to tangata whenua.

Small wonder, then, that Hipkins is asking all those New Zealanders anxious to be rid of the National-Act-NZ First Coalition to play it safe by making sure that Labour receives by far the largest share of the anti-government Party Vote. Keeping the parliamentary representation of Labour’s potential coalition partners as small as possible will also limit dramatically their ability to demand excessive and/or outlandish policy concessions.

A Green Party heading into the election with 15 percent of the vote is much more likely to make trouble for Labour than a Green Party hovering just above the 5 percent threshold. A Te Pāti Māori facing stiff competition from Labour in all the Māori seats, and registering insufficient voter support to crest the MMP threshold, will find it harder to justify the angry performative politics at which it excels.

The chances of Labour winning back all those voters who deserted it for the Right in 2023 would, of course, be seriously enhanced if Hipkins felt confident enough in his position to execute what might be called a “Newsom Turn”.

Gavin Newsom, the Democratic Governor of California, last week turned his face against his party’s uncompromising support for transgenderism. By coming out against biological males participating in sports formerly restricted to biological females, Newsom signalled that he would run for President in 2028 on a “non-woke” policy platform. His decision is the strongest signal yet that the Democratic National Committee’s hold on the party’s ideological direction is faltering.

A similar signal from Hipkins, indicating that Labour’s infatuation with Identity Politics was also waning, would hasten the return of the tens-of-thousands of supporters alienated by Labour’s 2020-23 policies. The true test of Hipkins’ leadership, however, would be whether or not he could prevent tens-of-thousands of outraged “progressives” responding to his “Newsom Turn” by deserting Labour for the Greens and Te Pāti Māori.

Clearly, Christopher Luxon is not the only politician with leadership problems.

This essay was originally posted on the Interest.co.nz website on Monday, 10 March 2025.

The Politics of Ostracism.

Ruled Out: The AfD, (Alternative für Deutschland) branded “Far Right” by Germany’s political mainstream, has been ostracised politically. The Christian Democrats (many of whose voters support the AfD’s tough anti-immigration stance) have ruled out any possibility of entering into a coalition with the radical-nationalist party.

THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT towards the political right across virtually the entire world is now indisputable. The latest demonstration of right-wing strength came earlier this week (23/2/25) in Germany where the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) alliance and the even more emphatically conservative Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) together accounted for just under half of the popular vote.

The corollary of right-wing strength is, of course, left-wing weakness. In Germany the traditional left-wing standard-bearer, the Social Democratic Party, slumped to its lowest share ever of the post-war popular vote. The Greens also lost ground. Only the relatively minor Left Party registered solid gains.

On its face, the German result would indicate the swift formation of a strong right-wing coalition government. The German electorate has, after all, delivered the right-wing parties a commanding majority in the German parliament. That such a coalition will not, as matters presently stand, eventuate, requires some explanation.

Predictably, that explanation derives from the twelve years that Germany spent under Nazi rule. The crimes committed against the German people and, ultimately, the entire world by Adolf Hitler and his followers presented the victors of the Second World War with a dilemma: How to establish a political system sufficiently robust to allow the Germans to rule themselves without embracing the same radical-nationalist ideas that gave birth to Nazism?

In the Russian Zone of occupied Germany “denazification” was accomplished by constructing another totalitarian state, the German Democratic Republic, in which a single political organisation, the Socialist Unity Party (superintended by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) controlled everything.

The American, British and French occupiers of the defeated Reich, already engaged in bitter ideological competition with the Soviets, could not be seen to embrace the totalitarian solutions of the Communists. Their brand-spanking-new Federal Republic of Germany could only be a democracy – with all the dangerous freedom that entails.

“Dangerous freedom”?

Of course “dangerous freedom”. Because, if freedom is to be anything other than a sham, it must encompass the possibility of its own rejection. People are not genuinely free unless they are also entrusted with the power to surrender their freedom. Liberty cannot be enforced.

The American, British and French occupiers disagreed. The constitution of their new republic was shaped in such a way that any political party unwilling to conform to its unwavering intolerance of anti-democratic ideas would be shunned by all the pro-democratic parties. If this political ostracism failed, and the voters, against all reason, continued to vote for an anti-democratic party in large numbers, then the all-powerful “Office for the Protection of the Constitution” could ban it altogether.

For good measure, all speech supportive of Hitler’s Nazi regime; the public display of Nazi symbols and memorabilia, and the use of Nazi greetings and slogans, was outlawed.

Following the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989, and the re-unification of Germany in 1990, the exclusion of the anti-democratic Right was extended to the anti-democratic Left. On the grounds that a number of its founders had been members of the Socialist Unity Party, the centrist Social Democrats and their Green Party allies point-blank refused to enter into a coalition with the Left Party.

The AfD, branded “Far Right” by Germany’s political mainstream, suffered a similar fate. The CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU (many of whose members support the AfD’s tough anti-immigration stance) have ruled out any possibility of entering into a coalition with the radical-nationalists.

For the long-suffering Germans this means enduring yet another “Grand Coalition” of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. (In New Zealand terms, National and Labour.) But these two ideological formations are traceable historically to very different socio-economic classes and cultural/religious divisions in German society. Politically-speaking, it is extremely difficult to effect a durable combination of chalk and cheese.

Nor is it a durable solution to the steady expansion of radical-nationalist populism in Germany, or, for that matter, across the globe. Once a political movement achieves sufficient momentum to double its popular support from 10 to 20 percent of the electorate, excluding it from political office becomes completely counterproductive. What meagre support for democratic principles that still exists within its ranks will disappear altogether.

The treatment of the AfD will thus prove the truth of German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous maxim: “What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger.”

This essay was originally published in The Otago Daily Times and The Greymouth Star of Friday, 28 February 2025.