What Are We Defending?

Following Our Example: Not even the presence of Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea will generate the sort of diplomatic breach the anti-China lobby has been working so assiduously for a decade to provoke. Too many New Zealanders recall the occasions when a New Zealand frigate has tagged along behind the Aussies and Americans in their regular voyages across the South China Sea and through the Taiwan Strait. 

A SMALL FORCE, just three ships, but its impact in a week of geopolitical transformation was devastating. Chinese naval vessels had sailed past Sydney at a distance of just 150 nautical miles. A clearer message to Australia and New Zealand could not have been sent by the Chinese Government: The Pacific is no longer an American lake.

The question to be answered, now, is: How should New Zealand respond? It’s armed forces are in a state of deplorable disrepair. Enlisted men and women are poorly paid and their morale is said to be dangerously low. Recruitment to all three services is bad and getting worse. The Royal New Zealand Navy, the service now in the spotlight, would struggle to show the flag in the Tasman Sea. If it tried, the not unreasonable fear would be that the vessel it sent might not come back. After all, the HMNZS Manawanui didn’t.

Defence Minister Judith Collins acknowledges these difficulties and is pledged to address them. New Zealand’s defence spending, expressed as a percentage of its GDP, is set to double over the next five years.

Unfortunately, that’s not saying much. Currently, New Zealand spends less that 1 percent of GDP on its armed forces. So, even a doubling of that figure would still leave us shy of the 2 percent figure now accepted globally as the minimum spend for any nation wishing to be taken seriously – not only by its enemies, but also by its friends.

According to Stats NZ: “The size of the New Zealand economy was $NZ415 billion for the year ended June 2024.” Working from this figure, if this country’s defence spending was to be brought up to the new minimum of 2 percent, a sum of roughly $8 billion would need to be appropriated by the House of Representatives. That’s an additional $3 billion on top of the 2024-25 appropriation.

That’s a lot of dollars to spend of guns and ships and planes when your country’s public health service is falling to pieces before its citizens’ horrified eyes. To supply the New Zealand Defence Force with an additional $3 billion, Finance Minister Nicola Willis would either have to embark on a blistering austerity programme reminiscent of Ruth Richardson’s 1991 “Mother of All Budgets”; or, the Coalition Government would have to raise taxes steeply. With an election looming in 2026, neither of those options is politically enticing.

Historically, securing general public support for a sharp increase in defence spending is almost impossible in the absence of a palpable – maybe even an existential – threat.

Following the successful conclusion of the Second World War, the administration of US President Harry S. Truman moved swiftly to restore American society to its pre-war settings. When the behaviour of the Soviet Union made it clear that the USA’s general demobilisation had been a tad premature, Truman rapidly concluded that to secure the appropriation of massive sums for the nation’s defence it would be necessary to, in the words of Senator Arthur Vandenberg: “scare the hell out of the American people”.

Fortunately for Truman, that proved to be less of a problem than many anticipated. Then, as now, the Russians made it easy!

Less so the Chinese – especially in New Zealand. The best efforts of Professor Anne-Marie Brady notwithstanding, casting the Peoples Republic in the role of Stalin’s Soviet Union has proved problematic. Most Kiwis are aware of the huge economic value of their country’s agricultural exports to China, and are, accordingly, in general support of the efforts of successive governments to avoid antagonising China to the point where the relationship between the two countries is jeopardised.

That being the case, not even the presence of Chinese warships in the Tasman is guaranteed to generate the sort of diplomatic breach the anti-China lobby has been working so assiduously for a decade to provoke. Too many New Zealanders recall the occasions when a New Zealand frigate has tagged along behind the Aussies and Americans in their regular voyages across the South China Sea and through the Taiwan Strait. If New Zealanders are entitled to sail where they please in international waters, then so too, presumably, are the Chinese.

What’s more, in light of the events of the past week, the Washington faction of MFAT faces a new and major problem. While the contrast between the United States and China remained stark, drawing attention to the totalitarian inclinations of its Communist Party rulers remained a reliable strategy. But, President Donald Trump’s affection for dictatorial regimes; the brutality of his transactional approach to international affairs; and his apparent repudiation of the “rules-based international order” in favour of cold-eyed realpolitik; makes it difficult for America (and its increasingly apprehensive allies) to retain their footing on the moral high-ground.

It is difficult to criticise the transactional elements of the relationships forged between China and the micro-states of the Pacific – the Cook Islands being only the latest in a succession of Chinese-initiated bilateral agreements negotiated in New Zealand’s “back yard” – when the United States is demanding half of Ukraine’s rare earths in part-payment for the American munitions supplied to counter Russian aggression.

What those three Chinese warships have produced, however, is a much more compelling argument for aligning New Zealand’s defensive posture in general and its military procurement in particular with Australia’s. In the much colder and more brutal world that is fast emerging from the collapse of the 80-year-old Pax Americana, only the Australians can be relied upon to protect us – and only then if they are satisfied that the Kiwis are pulling their weight.

What does that mean? It means finding that additional $3 billion and spending it. It means a much bigger and more effective navy. It means paying our soldiers, sailors, and air force personnel the sort of money that makes it easy for the NZDF to recruit and retain the best and the brightest young New Zealanders. It means a strategic military vision that makes sense to the NZDF, the politicians, and the overwhelming majority of New Zealanders. And, yes, it probably also means swallowing hard and signing up to AUKUS Pillar 2.

None of this will be of any use, however, in a nation divided against itself. A population composed of mutually antagonistic cultures and identities; a country racked by ideological differences and beset by conflicts made all the more intractable by the demonisation of every side except one’s own, cannot possibly achieve the consensus needed to construct an effective national defence.

If New Zealand is to defend itself, then the very first thing it needs to agree upon is the nature of the state it is defending. Is it a state committed to refashioning its ideas and institutions in conformity with the cultural imperatives of its indigenous people? Is it a state dedicated to maximising the ability of individuals to act effectively in the marketplaces of goods, services, and ideas? Is it a state dedicated to ensuring that every citizen has the support required to realise their full potential? Is it mixture of all three?

Until we can agree upon the shape and purpose of the state for which we are annually appropriating 2 percent (or more) of the nation’s economic output, then the long-overdue refurbishment and rehabilitation of our armed forces is unlikely to, and probably shouldn’t, happen.

Denied the easy option of marching behind British and American drums, and before they simply fall in step with the Australians, New Zealanders should sort-out why, and for what, they are willing to march at all.

This essay was originally posted on the Interest.co.nz website on Monday, 24 February 2025.